Showing posts with label 7th brigade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 7th brigade. Show all posts
Hold at all cost-"Tzvika Force" Golan Heights 1973 Yom Kippur War
An article written by Major Michael Wickman US Army on Armor Magazeen March April 2001
At 1400 hours on 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces surged across their borders with Israel. The massive surprise attack found Israel outnumbered in vehicles,equipment, and personnel,in some instances, by 50 to 1. Israel’s vaunted air forc was held at bay by a wall of
surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, and Israeli armored columns were made vulnerable by the Syrians’ excellent use of anti-tank missiles During the first days of the battle, it appeared that Israel’s defenses would be overrun, but due to the heroic efforts of Israeli soldiers, the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) was able to turn apparent defeat into a sudden rout of the armies of Syria and Egypt. Nowhere was the situation more critical than on the Golan Heights. The purpose of this article is to focus on the bravery and achievements of a few soldiers fighting on the Golan
Heights and their effect on the outcome of the Yom Kippur War. Of particular note are the actions of one Israeli armor officer, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold. The primary objective of Syrian
forces was the recapture of the 480 square miles of the Golan Heights lost to the IDF during the 1967 Six Day War. Syria planned to mount a major breakthrough attempt in the north with
the 7th Infantry Division, supported by elements of the 3rd Armored Division. The main thrust, however, was to be farther south in the vicinity of Rafid.This attack was to be carried out by the
5th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and elements of the 3rd Armored Division,all concentrated against Israel’s 188th Brigade, which could field only around 60 tanks. The Syrian plan called for the occupation of the whole of the Golan Heights by the evening of Sunday,7 October, followed by reorganization in the area along the River Jordan on Israeli soil in preparation for a further breakthrough into Galilee. Major-General Yitzhak Hofi, head of Israel’sNorthern Command, had beenconcerned for some time over the growing concentration of Syrian armored forces. He had expressed his concerns to Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, who authorized units of the 7th Armored Brigade, which were beingheld in General Headquarters Reserve in the southern part of Israel, to move up to the Golan Heights. This move increased the number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights from an initial number
of some 60 to 170.The Syrian forces arrayed along the Golan Heights consisted of the 7th Infantr Division, the 9th Infantry Division,and the 5th Infantry Division. Each was organized along Soviet lines, with an armored brigade totaling some 130-200 tanks per division. Behind
these first echelon divisions were concentrated the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions,
each with approximately 250 tanks, along with several independent brigades. The total Syrian force facing Israel numbered approximately 1,500 Russian T-54/55 and T-62 tanks supported
by 1,000 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars. The IDF’s plan for defending the Golan Heights was based on two points. First, topography afforded the Israelis well thought-out superior defensive positions. Second,Syrian devotion to the prevailing Soviet operationa level doctrine limited availableopenings for the massive assaults prescribed by that doctrine.An anti-tank barrier was constructed to limit a Syrian armored attack over the 1967cease fire or Purple Line. The purpose of the barrier was to delay the Syrians sufficiently until reserve forces could be committed to reinforce units on the line. Time was the primary issue for both the Israelis and the Syrians. The IDF needed time to deploy reserves before a Syrian breakthrough or, “if politically possible, to mount spoiling attack” as a preemptive measure. The Syrians needed
to quickly penetrate the IDF defenses and reach the edge of the plateau overlooking
the bridges of the River Jordan before the arrival of IDF reserve forces.
This would force the IDF to move their reserves across choke points and up steep narrow winding roads, making a successful counter attack nearly impossible. The Israeli forces defending the Golan Heights were composed of two Israeli armored brigades, the 7th in the northern sector and 188th (Barak) Brigade in the southern sector, consisting of approximately
170 tanks and some 60 artillery pieces. Israeli armored forces were composed of British Centurions and M51 Shermans.The massive Syrian air and artillery strike against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights achieved tactical surprise.The Syrian 7th, 9th, and 5th Infantry
Divisions attacked across the Purple Line, while in the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade repulsed the Syrian 7th Infantry Division. The Syrian 3rd Armored Division, committed
to pass through Israeli’s 7th Infantry Division, also suffered heavily and gained little ground. In the south, the Syrian 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions,taking advantage of the less restrictive
terrain, broke through the defenses of the Barak Brigade. In two days of fighting,the Barak Brigade was virtually destroyed, and the command post at Nafakh surrounded. The Syrian 9th
Infantry Division “had split the Israeli defensive forces, and now threatened the command center at Nafakh. The remnants of the Barak Brigade were barely hanging on and were in desperate need of reinforcements. The collapse of the northern sector could have forced the IDF to fall back to the Jordan River and therefore changed the outcome of the war. The original plan of reinforcing with reserve brigades was falling apart. “As Israeli reserves arrived on the shore of Lake Tiberius and the west bank of the River Jordan,they were immediately sent forward in small groups into battle.At this time, something just short of a miracle was underway at Nafakh. Frantically trying to reach the Golan by any means possible was [Lieutenant] Tzvi ‘Zvika’ Greengold, who had been on a fortnight’s leave.” Lieutenant Greengold had been safely at home, near Haifa, only seven hours earlier. He had just been released from service with the Barak Brigade and was on leave for two weeks prior to attending a company commander’s course. He was one of the first soldiers to make his own way back to the battlefield. At the Nafakh headquarters of the Barak Brigade, the commander, Colonel Ben-Shoham, was analyzing spot reports coming in from his battalion commanders on the size of the Syrian attack. While he was deciding his next moves, he was approached by Lieutenant Greengold, who arrived to find Nafakh in chaos. Greengold, having no troops nor tanks to command, assisted with the removal of the dead and wounded from disabled vehicles. He soon learned that four tanks, three of which had been battle-damaged, were about to arrive. Zvika requested and received command of the four tanks.He was delighted. Lieutenant Greengold was ordered to take the four tanks and move towards the Tapline Route, a major Syrian avenue of approach. Lieutenant Greengold and his four tanks were to be known on the brigade communications network as Force Tzvika.
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| Captain Tzvika Greengold in 1973 |
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| Tzvika Greengold 2010 |
By that time, Colonel Ben-Shoham was greatly concerned by the Syrian advances in the southern sector, where the 51st Tank Brigade had broken through and was bypassing the Israeli
fortifications in the vicinity of the Hushniya-Tapline crossroads. Savage nighttime firefights were taking place across the southern Golan Heights, and Israeli troops were cut off in their frontline fortifications. Transmissions to their headquarters at Nafakh finally produced authorization to withdraw, but this was easier said than done, with Syrian forces to their rear. At Kudne, a relieving tank force broke through to Bunker 111, despite strong Syrian forces in the immediate vicinity, and succeeded in evacuating all the men.
Along the southern flank, where the battle was then heaviest, the fight was more difficult. Israeli tanks fought through and relieved Bunker 114 and Bunker 115, but Bunker 116 was completely
surrounded. Unable to get out, the Israelis sat tight in their defenses and called for artillery support. The only available artillery was a single battery of 155mm guns, which was ordered to concentrate on Bunker 116’s position. The fire mission was extremely effective and provided
temporary relief to the troops inside. Because of the penetration in his sector along the Tapline Road, Colonel Ben-Shoham attempted to move the forward headquarters (one tank and onehalftrack) of his brigade from Nafakh to Juhader, where he believed he could
better control the battle. He moved carefully along in the dark, avoiding Syrian formations, and his staff was relieved to reach Juhader. By then, they were under constant heavy shelling,
due to poor IDF communications discipline and successful Syrian SIGINT operations. The Syrians obtained radio fixes every time a communications officer tried to contact his subordinate commanders. In the meantime, TF Zvika, which had left Nafakh several hours before, was moving cautiously along the Tapline Route. Zvika had been intent on joining
Colonel Ben-Shoham, but instead had run into a Syrian tank company. Zvika promptly sent a contact report to Colonel Ben-Shoham and first engaged the enemy at 2100 hours on 6 October. Zvika took advantage of the terrain and limited visibility, moving his force into hull-down positions and letting the enemy come to him. Zvika’s force waited only a short time until one of his tank commanders reported contact with an approaching Syrian column consisting mostly of T-55s. Zvika peered into the gloom and saw them by the dim glow of their “formation lamps and infra-red ‘cats eyes’.At about 2120 hours, Zvika spotted a solitary Syrian tank on the road about four kilometers outside Nafakh and only ten meters from his own Centurion. Zvika tapped his gunner, and the Syrian burst into flames. Fearful of being seen or set ablaze in the horrendous flash of burning fuel and munitions, Zvika ordered his driver to back up fast. He then found that he had no way of communicating with the other tank or of even speaking with his own crew. The shock of the explosion of the Syrian tank had jolted out the radio and intercom circuits. Zvika jumped down to the roadway and stalked over to the other Centurion, ejecting its commander and motioning him to climb aboard the defective tank. “Watch me,” he cautioned the other man, “and do as I do, if possible.Zvika then continued to work his way south along the Tapline Road, the two tanks moving slowly forward, using the terrain to mask their movement. Zvika soon realized that he was alone, the other tank having lost its position in the dark. Moving over the crest of a hill,Zvika was confronted by three Syrian tanks moving towards them with their driving lights on. Three rapid shots from the Centurion’s 105mm gun left the enemy tanks blazing brightly, and the illumination of the area from the fire greatly aided Zvika’s movement. The intruders belonged to the 51st Independent Tank Brigade, and they were feeling their way into the Israeli rear, seeking to exploit the breakthrough. Apparently they had turned on their sidelights to see better, to gain speed.Zvika shifted into a new position and within minutes destroyed three more T55s. Zvika realized that the Tapline Road was a major avenue of approach,that he was frequently outnumbered and he was facing tanks with superior night fighting capabilities. Zvika chose to hold in his current position, take advantage of the defensible terrain, and wait for Syrian forces. Thirty minutes passed until they were alerted by the sound of heavy engines. A long column of T-55s appeared out of the darkness, followed by a procession of trucks. “It was as if the main body of Major Ismail’s 452nd Tank Battalion was on
parade, so perfectly aligned and spaced was the column. Zvika waited until the lead tank was
only twenty meters from where he was hunkered down. The first shot stopped the first target and stalled the entire column Zvika was up against terrible odds, but he had the enemy fixed and was in position to destroy the entire column. Zvika withdrew into the darkness, taking advantage of the scrub and rocky outcrops, only to appear and fire before disappearing again. He kept this uneven match going for over an hour.The Syrians’ sole warning was a crash and a long jet of white flame shooting through the night to destroy another of their vehicles. The Syrians were extremely bewildered by the single shot that kept hitting their tanks from all along the roadway. Frustrated, several Syrian tankers switched on searchlights to try and locate what they thought was a sizeable enemy force. The illumination gave Zvika and his gunner more clear targets to engage. Ten armored vehicles were either destroyed or damaged before Major Ismail ordered the remnants of his battalion to withdraw.
What the Syrians believed was a sizable force was actually the work of a single tank crew.
Several miles further along the Tapline Road at Nafakh, Colonel Ben-Shoham realized he was surrounded. His brigade intelligence officer suggested that as it was impossible to get
back to the Nafakh headquarters by the Tapline Road, they had better cut across country. Colonel Ben-Shoham directed his tank and the headquarters’ half-track to head west toward the ridge of the Golan Heights near Ramat Magshimim. At approximately 0200 on October 7, they reached the Gamla Rise overlooking the Sea of Galilee, a primary objective of the Syrian forces. They were dismayed to observe new Syrian T-62 tanks not far away along
the escarpment, and in full view of Galilee. At that rate, Syrian forces would soon cross into Israel proper. The Israeli tank and its accompanying half-track continued to move along in
dim moonlight, keeping among the boulders on the slopes to screen themselves
from the large Syrian force moving parallel to their position. Colonel Ben-Shoham tried to determine the status of his brigade, and feared that very little remained. Meanwhile back in
Nafakh, a reserve battalion commander named Lieutenant Colonel Uzi More
received permission from the CinC of Northern Command to leave the base and take command of the tanks along the Tapline Route. He was to fight a delaying action along the Tapline
Route to slow the Syrian advance towards Nafakh Camp. This force included Zvika’s small group and two reserve tank platoons of the Northern Command Reserve, which were the
only reserves available in the southern sector. Lieutenant Colonel More received
the order from Colonel Ben- Shoham to mount a counterattack, and proceeded southwards along the Tapline Route, while Tzvika and a platooof tanks drove parallel along the road’s wire fences. Almost immediately, the first tank in Zvika’s column was set ablaze by a rocket-propelled grenade. Zvika saw Syrian tanks equipped with searchlights blocking the road ahead, and Zvikaordered one of the remaining tanks forward to rescue the crew of the burning Centurion. He positioned his own tank to cover in the flank, and both tanks were hit. Zvika’sgunner was injured, while Zvika himself reeled from the shock of the blast and searing pain. Zvika and his crew scrambled from their blazing Centurion, falling to the ground in flames and screaming as flames seared their faces and hands. Zvika’s shirt and trousers were burning,
but he rolled into a ditch and somehow smothered the flames. He was fearful that at any moment his tank, still carrying fuel and ammunition, would blow up. Not realizing the extent of his wounds, he ran towards another tank, shouted garbled instructions, and took command of the vehicle. He then activated the communications system, announcing to all that TF Zvika was still in existence Even as Colonel Ben- Shoham’s relieved acknowledgment faded on the radio, Zvika realized the extent of his wounds, and the terrible burns on his face and hands began to throb and blister. Only Colonel Ben-Shoham’s calm but insistent voice brought him back to reality. Moving straight for him were two Syrian tanks, bearing down with their guns firing. Zvika fired and screamed for his driver to reverse. The tank shuddered as its tracks tore around on the bare rocks, then raced backward into the inferno of the night, its crew still battling against the heavy odds.
The remainder of Colonel Ben-Shoham’s counterattack force also made contact with the mechanized infantry that had been accompanying the tanks that Zvika encountered. More’s tanks were hit and disabled, one at a time. When More saw a Syrian soldier aim an antitank rocket at his command tank,he grabbed hold of his free machine gun and opened fire. However, his machine gun jammed and the Syrian grenadier let fly. More was thrown from his tank and lost an arm and an eye in the blast. Colonel Ben-Shoham reported up the chain of command the failure of his counterattack and did his best to stabilize the situation. With minimal resources he calmed the nerves of his commanders, called for artillery support, and attempted to maintain situational awareness of the battle that surrounded.
In order to improve command and control, Colonel Ben-Shoham requested the command of all forces in the southern Golan from the regional commander. It was apparent that the
Syrians were swarming all over the southern sector of the Golan Heights. In the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade was defending positions in and around Booster Ridge against the Syrian
7th Infantry Division, elements of the 3rd Armored Division, and a brigade of Moroccan troops. Fighting from prepared positions, the Centurionequipped 7th Armored Brigade held out
against odds sometimes as high as 15 to 1. Under constant artillery and air attack,
Colonel Ben Gal, the 7th Armored Brigade commander, calmly directed his dwindling forces, maintaining a reserve which he moved from ambush to blocking position to battle position
during 72 hours of continuous fighting. The 7th Armored Brigade, although down to a handful of operational tanks,never gave up their primary positions.In the southern sector, the crisis continued to develop. Sunrise on the 7th of October revealed that the Syrians had
achieved a major breakthrough in the southern sector of the Golan Heights. The 132nd Mechanized Brigade and 47th Independent Tank Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division had made a major penetration along the Rafid El-Al road.The Syrians exploited this penetration
with the 43rd, 51st, and 91st Armored Brigade, a force of more than 500 tanks. Colonel Ben-Shoham identified the advancing second-echelon Syrian columns, and chose to regroup his forces and attempt to delay the Syrian penetration. His tank and half-track sped back
towards Nafakh, dodging tank and RPG fire along the entire route. Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route. He decided his best course of action would be to rally his meager forces and join his deputy, Colonel Yisraeli, and the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade (now reaching the front
in small numbers). “Every three tanks now reaching the front were assembled into make-shift
platoons, patched into the communications network and rushed towards Ben- Shoham’s position. All in all, two companies were pieced together, and the newly formed units reached Nafakh and re-established the Barak Brigade’s headquarters. At approximately 1145, Major Baruch Lenschner identified a lead element from the Syrian 1st Armored Division
as the 91st Armored Brigade. Major Lenschner, Deputy Commander of an independent Northern Command battalion, was commanding a hastily assembled force of initially 14 Centurions. That was now down to two operable tanks. He reported sighting the T-62s of
the 91st Armored Brigade and stated that his position was untenable. Colonel Ben-Shoham urged the young major to hold at any cost. Major Lenschner and his small force were not heard from again. It was later determined that Major Lenschner perished when the warhead
of a Sagger missile punched through the Centurion’s turret armorand his force was overrun.15 Outflanked, the brigade headquarters at Nafakh was now under attack. Ben- Shoham was ordered to return to Nafakh for the base’s defense, and ordered his deputy Lieutenant-Colonel
Yisraeli to set out and cover his force. Unknown to Colonel Ben-Shoham, Zvika had met up with Colonel Yisraeli’s force at dawn and fought in the battle that delayed the Syrian 51st Tank rigade’s attack along the Tapline Route. Just when Zvika had thought they were gaining the upper hand, Yisraeli frantically ordered his force back to Nafakh to escape the Syrians’ outflanking movement. Throughout the retreat, Colonel Ben- Shoham’s tank came under heavy Syrian artillery and tank fire. Both he and Yisraeli succeeded in destroying more
than twenty Syrian tanks and vehicles. As the battle raged and Syrian tanks approached to close range, Yisraeli’s gunner announced that the tank was out of ammunition. Yisraeli ordered his
driver to charge an oncoming T-62 with machine guns blazing. Within moments,
his tank in flames, Lieutenant-Colonel Yisraeli was dead. Ben-Shoham, unaware of the fate of his deputy, continued to issue orders. Standing upright in the turret, Ben-Shoham observed
the battle, firing at Syrian crewmen fleeing their burning vehicles. As he searched the hills for Syrian commandos, a sudden 7.62mm volley killedColonel Ben-Shoham. Losing radio con-
“Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route.”tact with his commanders, Zvika left the roadway and approached Nafakh cross-country from the southeast without encountering Syrian forces, but just missing a Syrian ambush. The 91st Armored Brigade continued its push towards Nafakh. Lieutenant- Colonel Menachem (Pinie) Cooperman, deputy commander of the District (administrative) Brigade, organized Nafakh’s defenses and issued antitank weapons to soldiers manning the perimeter. Standing at the southern perimeter fence, he watched the advance of approximately two Syrian tank companies, and ordered the advanced headquarters group to withdraw from Nafakh. As this force left the base, hundreds of Syrian shells rained down on the camp. Syrian tanks were now entering Nafakh unhindered, firing pointblank at the base’s evacuated buildings, raking the Israeli defenders with coaxial and turret-mounted machine guns. Lieutenant- Colonel Cooperman grabbed the division’s deputy intelligence and operations officers, a bazooka and six shells,and rushed to try and stop the Syrians from taking Nafakh. Suddenly, the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade arrived to save the day. Firing at long range, the 679th managed to hold the Syrians and push them out of Nafakh. Yet Syrian tanks were still
inside the base, and Lieutenant Colonel Cooperman’s determined antitank unit, now out of ammunition, was cornered by a T-62. As the T-62’s 115mm gun turned towards them, the tank went up n a ball of flame. Approaching the rescued officers was a battered tank moving at a slow speed. It was Zvika! Zvika had arrived at Nafakh camp just as the Syrians were breaking in, he had joined forces with a reserve tank, and with more enthusiasm than good sense his exhausted crew attacked the Syrians.
“Zvika fired wildly at everything in sight — at the hills and the fences and at the Syrian tanks that had already flattened the perimeter fence. The truth was that his tank driver was in the
shock of exhaustion and could no longer react to orders after twenty hours of continuous, nerve-twisting battle. During the pandemonium, Zvika attached himself to the 679th Armored
Brigade and with them forced the Syrians out of the ruined camp and back
onto the Tapline Road. The Syrian advance had been stopped at Nafakh and the blackened, smoking wreckage of their tanks, personnel carriers, and trucks lay everywhere, in the
camp and on the dun-colored hills. “When the battle around Zvika ceased,he found himself standing in the turret of his fifth or sixth Centurion, suddenly unable to make a decision as to what to do next. The Barak Brigade intelligence officer — now the nominal brigade
commander — rushed up to greet the lieutenant. As he fought an overwhelming
lethargy, Zvika painfully climbed from the turret and carefully dropped to the ground, where he leveled his eyes on the intelligence officer and apologetically murmured, ‘I can’t anymore.’ The intelligence officer said not a word; he hugged Zvika close and led him to the medical evacuation center. There is no way to calculate the damage that that iron-willed redheaded youth inflicted upon the best plan with which Syria has ever entered a conflict.
To say that the actions of Lieutenant Zvika Greengold directly affected the
outcome of the Yom Kippur war would be an overstatement. But it goes without
saying that his actions greatly aided the successful defense of the Golan
Heights. “For his incredible 24 hours on the Golan, Lieutenant Greengold was
awarded the Ot Hagvura (Order of Bravery), the IDF’s medal for supreme
valor.
MAJ Michael D. Wickman, commissioned
in Armor from OCS, has
served as a mortar platoon leader
in 2-37 Armor and a tank platoon
leader in 1-37 Armor in Germany.
He served as a tactical intelligence
officer in G2 TAC, 34th Infantry Division,
and assistant J2, Task Force
Timberwolf, Guatemala. He served
as S2, S4, and tank company commander
in 1-94 Armor. He is a
graduate of AOBC, AOAC, MIOTC,
and CAS3.Rare home 8 mm film made by a IDF reserve soldier
in south of the Golan during the Yom Kuppur War
including a Syrian Mig 17 crash near the force
during battle
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| IDF command half track hit during the battle |
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| Iraqi tanks hit by the IDF in shouth of the Golan |
Avigdor Kahalani -"OZ 77" -7th Brigade- Yom Kippur War 1973 עוז 77 אביגדור קהלני-חטיבה 7 -"עמק הבכא"
7th Brigade
Yom Kippur War started on 6 October 1973. Egyptian forces stormed into Sinai, Syrian forces into the Golan Heights. Israel was taken by surprise. The 77th Battalion was, by chance, in the Golan. The war continued for 20 days. More than 2500 Israeli soldiers lost their lives, with thousands more injured in body and soul.
Kahalani was a career officer in the IDf
(1973), he served as commander of an armored battalion on the Golan Heights. Kahalani received the Medal of Distinguished Service
for service during the Six Day War, where he was badly wounded his tank
caught fire. He later received the Medal of Valor
During this war he commanded a hastily assembled group of tanks and crews from different armour units (The Israeli forces were in a disjointed state due to the surprise combined Arab attack which commenced the war). The group repelled a vastly superior Syrian force which had overrun the Israeli positions in the first days of the war, in the Golan Heights
The battle proved to be one of the turning points of the war. After the war, the valley where it took place was littered with dozens of burned Syrian tanks and was renamed "Emek Ha-Bacha" ("The Valley of Tears"
To read more on "valley of tears" go to:http://idf-armor.blogspot.com/2009/08/valley-of-tears-golan-1973-yom-kippur.html
Rare pictures of Avigdor Kahalni days after the end of Yom Kippur War from the Valley of Tears on the Golan
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| Avigdor Kahalani with his crew 1973 |
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| The crew meet years later |
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| On a detroyed Syrian T 62 |
Tweet
Valley of tears-Golan-1973 Yom Kippur war
עמק הבכא במלחמת יום כיפור 1973-המצגת של עוזי טאובר
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| Destroyed Syrian T 62 tanks |
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| Syrian T 55 days after the Yom Kippur War |
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| Syrian armor |
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| Syrian BTR 60 |
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| Syrian T 55 |
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| Syrian BTR 50 |
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| Syrian anti aircraft unit in the Valley of Tears |
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| Syrian trucks |
Syrian armor after the war in the valley of tears
Valley of Tears
The Valley of Tears - Emek HaBakha is the name given to an area in the Golan Heights after it became the site of a major battle in the Yom Kippur War. On 6 October, 1973 the Syrian 7th Infantry Division attacked the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade in the area between Mount Hermonit and a southern ridge known as "Booster" in Israel, or Tel el Mekhafi in Arabic.
The Syrians started the offensive with an artillery barrage, but failed to move tanks across the anti-tank ditch. They penetrated the Israeli defenses at night with the help of night vision equipment—equipment that the Israelis lacked. The next day, the Syrians mounted a second attack, and at one point in the engagement less than forty Israeli tanks were facing approximately 500 Syrian tanks.
On the fourth day, the 7th Brigade received a small reinforcement force when it was down to about a dozen tanks and almost out of ammunition and turned the battle
to offensive against the Syrians.
A presentation by Mr. Uzi Tauber tank driver in the 7th' Brigade in 1973 Yom Kippur
War.Took part in the Valley of tears battle.
Today Uzi is an expert Tourists guide in Israel and around the world,
Uzi site: http://www.uzitauber.com/
IDF Armor and tank corps History and background -Tzhal
Armor Corps
The Israeli Armor Corps is a corps of the Israel Defense Forces, since 1998 subordinate to GOC Army Headquarters. The Armor Corps is the principal maneuvering corps, and primarily bases its strength on Main Battle Tanks. The Armor Corps is the decisive corps in GOC Army Headquarters, and bases its “crushing power” on its “fists of steel”: a combination of mobility, armor, and firepower. During wars, its role is, on the one hand, to lead the first line of the attacking forces and to clear the area of the enemy, while on the other hand, to block the armor forces of the enemy and to destroy its tanks and armor. During peacetime, it reinforces the Infantry Corps while it performs security tasks, with the tanks serving as a mobile bunker.
Divisions and brigades
The 36th Division
Also known as the Ga’ash Formation, is the largest armor division in the IDF, and also includes Engineering Corps soldiers who are attached to it. It is stationed on the Golan Heights under the Northern Command. . It includes the 7th and 188th Brigades.
The 7th Brigade
Also known as the Sa’ar (”Storm”) Formation, this is a regular armor brigade which is placed under the command of the Northern Command. It is the first armor brigade of the IDF and has participated in all of Israel’s wars. The brigade’s fighting during the Suez War resulted in a breakthrough in how the army approached the character of armor warfare.
Today, the brigade is equipped with Mark 2 Merkava tanks.
The 188 Brigade
Also known as the Barak (”Lightning”) Formation, it is a regular armor brigade which is placed under the command of the Northern Command. Starting with the Six Day War, the brigade participated in all of Israel’s wars. During the Yom Kippur War, the brigade was the first line of defense in the first day of the war at the Southern Golan, and saw almost all of its officers killed in action. It was the last armor brigade to use the Centurion tank, converted into Merkava 3 tanks in 1992.
The 162nd Division
Also known as the Utzvat Ha’Barzel Formation, this is an armor division which is placed under the Central Command.
The 14 Armored Brigade
The brigade was active during the War of Attrition when it split to provide the basis for the 401st Armoured Brigade. During the Yom Kippur War, it was initially an armoured reserve supporting the infantry brigades holding the Bar-Lev Line. It suffered terrible casualties during the war but was rebuilt afterwards.[1]
The 211th Brigade
Also known as the Yishai (acronym for “Guardians of Jerusalem Unit”), during the Lebanon War of 1982, it was famously led by Colonel Eli Geva, who during the Siege of Beirut refused to lead his soldiers into the city for moral reasons. He was dismissed from the army, and the brigade itself was dissolved in the early 1990s.
The 401 Brigade
Also known as the Ikvot Habarzel (”Tracks of Iron”) Formation, this is an armor brigade created in 1968 in order to control the Suez Canal line. During the Yom Kippur War, it faced the first line of attack in the canal and suffered heavy losses. During the 1982 Lebanon War, it fought in the Southern force and one of its battalions participated in the Sultan Yaakov battle. During 2004-2005, the brigade’s tanks were converted into Mark 4 Merkava tanks.
The 847 Brigade
This is a reserve brigade also known as Merkavot Haplada (Steel Chariots), equipped with Mark 2 Merkava tanks. Up to the year 2000 the main equipment was old Magach AFVs. Recently, the brigade took part in the 2006 Lebanon War, most notably in the Battle of Bint Jbeil and battle of Yaroon, in the war the brigade eliminated approximately 60 Hezbollah fighters.
The 460th Brigade
Also known as the Bney Or (”Sons of Light”) Formation, this is the training brigade of the Armor Corps. It maintains two bases: the Shizafon (”tanning”) base, which is the training school for the corps’ commanders, where the officers and tank commanders are instructed. The Magen Sayarim (”Scout Defense”) Camp maintains the armor training school where basic and continued training is undertaken, preparing armor combatants toward the operational brigades.
The 500 Brigade
Also known as the Kfir (”Young Lion”) Formation, this was a regular armor brigade which operated from 1972 until 2003. During the Yom Kippur War, it participated in the battle over the city of Suez. During the Lebanon War of 1982, it fought in the framework of the Eastern force and participated in the Eyn Zhalata battle. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the lessening of the threat from the eastern front, the brigade was dissolved.
Barak Armored Brigade:
Introduction
The Barak Brigade is one of the regular armored brigades of the Northern Command. The Barak Brigade was formed before the establishment of the State of Israel, when it was known as the Carmeli Brigade. It was then an infantry brigade which fought in the north of Israel, from the Western Galilee to kibbutz Manara. Today, the brigade’s symbol is that of the Carmeli brigade, which has been used since the brigade was established. After the establishment of the State, all the independent Jewish fighting units were dismantled, the IDF was created and the Carmeli brigade became the “18th Brigade”. During the Sinai Campaign, the brigade was deployed on the Jordanian border, and therefore did not have an active role in the combat. One of the main conclusions after the war was that the army needed armored units, and the 18th Brigade started the changeover by becoming “the 45th Armored Brigade”.
The brigade commander, Moshe Bar-Kochba (Brill) commanded the brigade in the Six Day War. The brigade received the Eastern sector. The IDF took the initiative to attack, in order to remove the threat of the Long Tom guns on the valley settlements and on the Ramat David airfield. The brigade fought a number of bloody battles in the Dotan Valley, which ended with the blowing up of the Jordan river bridges.
At the start of the 1970s, the brigade participated in armored attacks on terrorist bases in South Lebanon and Syria.
The experiences of the brigade during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 were particularly difficult. At the time, the Barak brigade was the only regular armored force on the Golan Heights. In the light of intelligence reports, the 7th Armored Division was sent to the Golan Heights two days before the outbreak of hostilities. However, the 7th Division soldiers were not familiar with the Golan Heights. The two brigades were spread out is isolated teams along the border line. The Barak brigade was responsible for the Southern Golan Heights sector. The main Syrian efforts to break through the border was in the Southern Golan Heights area, and the ratio of defenders to attackers forces was extremely unfavorable.
During the Yom Kippur War, 112 soldiers from the Barak brigade were killed in action.
After the war the brigade rebuilt itself and later participated in the Litani Campaign and other armored operations.
In the Peace for Galilee War, the brigade led division forces into Lebanon. This war was in built-up areas, hardly the typical combat arena for armor. The brigade fought in the Beirut sector, and participated in the capture of the airport. It then continued to fight in the eastern sector in Lebanon. The brigade participated in all subsequent redeployments stabilizing the lines in the Lebanese sector, and was among the last forces to leave Lebanon.
In recent years, the brigade has changed over from the Centurion tank, which it used for an entire generation, to the ultramodern Merkava Mark 3 main battle tank. This changeover to the best combat tank in the world today has just been completed.
A.M.X 13 (France) in the IDF Tank Corps
א.מ.אקס 13 בשרות חיל השריון
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| A.M.X 13 in 1968 IDF Parade in Jerusalem |
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| A.M.X 13 During 1967 Six Days War |
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| A.M.X platoon in sharem A Shike in Sinai 1967 |
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| AMX 13 In the Six Days War |
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| A.M.X 13 On a landing craft of the Israeli navy 1968 |
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| A.M.X 13 of the 7th Brigade in the 60's |
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| latrun memorial site |
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| :27th Armored Brigade Memorial |
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| A.M.X During 1967 Six Days War |
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In cooperation with the Israeli electronics firm Elbit and Nimda, has planned and prepared a prototype up-rated AMX-13 light tank. The IDF had operated some 200 of this type as its first modern tank, received just before the Sinai campaign (1956) and had made several modifications , especially in regard to improving its performance in severe desert conditions. It has been sold to several Asian countries, foremost Singapore . The Israelis had, over the years of its service life (3 AMX-13 battalions took active part in the fighting of the Six Day War in 1967), amassed a large amount of combat and maintenance experience with this vehicle .
Now this, as well anther expertise, has served well to bring about an excellent, original solution to the problem of modernizing the obsolete AMX-13 light and restoring its service life for modern tank combat, especially for those countries whose economic infrastructure requires tanks of less than 25 ton ,due to restricted bridge-crossing capabilities or limited gauge rail systems for transportation .
The new combat profile of the Nimda AMX 13 is powered by the DDA-6V- 53 T Diesel engine which produces 275 hp at 2800rpm (the original SOFAM petrol engine produced 240 hp at 3200rpm), and weighs 612 kg .
A major problem - to refit the tank with its new DDA power train required a modification of the engine, enabling it to be fitted into the restricted engine department space with an angle inclination adapted base produced by the Detroit manufactures and specially designed for the project. The improved automation, which includes a dry type, mechanically actuated clutch and cooling system (a marked improvement ove the original problematic hot climate system which caused much trouble), increases the modernized AMX -13's range by 150 km .
A dramatic improvement in the tank's combat effectiveness is obtained by the inclusion of the Elbit LANCELOT Fire Control System, which greatly enhances the day or night combat capability, as well as first hit probability, thereby increasing survivability by reducing exposure time ; the original shape and low silhouette gave it excellent hull-down position selection capacity .
The Elbit LANCELOT system improves the first round hit probability by correcting the relevant systematic errors that occur when firing against stationary or moving targets with the aid of a digital computer , laser rangefinder and second-generation image intensifier. Gunner's day and night sight and an optional commander's control unit enable the crew to function excellently in two-man turret .
The main armament, originally the 75 mm HV gun (IDF) and up gunned versions, 90 mm (France) or 105 mm (Netherlands), can be retained to function with the modernized system. With long rod ammunition, the armour-piercing performance can be enhanced considerably with high cost effectiveness
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| 1967 |
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| IDF forces leaving Gazza after 1956 war |
Rare 8 mm home film from the Six Days War 1967
in Sinai including IDF A M X unit tank in Sharem EL Shieke
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IDF Sherman platoon pre 1967
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Israel must be strong