Showing posts with label 188 brigade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 188 brigade. Show all posts

Hold at all cost-"Tzvika Force" Golan Heights 1973 Yom Kippur War

An article written by Major Michael Wickman  US Army on Armor Magazeen March April 2001

At 1400 hours on 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces surged across their borders with Israel. The massive surprise attack found Israel outnumbered in vehicles,equipment, and personnel,in some instances, by 50 to 1. Israel’s vaunted air forc was held at bay by a wall of
surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, and Israeli armored columns were made vulnerable by the Syrians’ excellent use of anti-tank missiles During the first days of the battle, it appeared that Israel’s defenses would be overrun, but due to the heroic efforts of Israeli soldiers, the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) was able to turn apparent defeat into a sudden rout of the armies of Syria and Egypt. Nowhere was the situation more critical than on the Golan Heights. The purpose of this article is to focus on the bravery and achievements of a few soldiers fighting on the Golan
Heights and their effect on the outcome of the Yom Kippur War. Of particular note are the actions of one Israeli armor officer, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold. The primary objective of Syrian
forces was the recapture of the 480 square miles of the Golan Heights lost to the IDF during the 1967 Six Day War. Syria planned to mount a major breakthrough attempt in the north with
the 7th Infantry Division, supported by elements of the 3rd Armored Division. The main thrust, however, was to be farther south in the vicinity of Rafid.This attack was to be carried out by the
5th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and elements of the 3rd Armored Division,all concentrated against Israel’s 188th Brigade, which could field only around 60 tanks. The Syrian plan called for the occupation of the whole of the Golan Heights by the evening of Sunday,7 October, followed by  reorganization in the area along the River Jordan on Israeli soil in preparation for a further breakthrough into Galilee. Major-General Yitzhak Hofi, head of Israel’sNorthern Command, had beenconcerned for some time over the growing concentration of Syrian armored forces. He had expressed his concerns to Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, who authorized units of the 7th Armored Brigade, which were beingheld in General Headquarters Reserve in the southern part of Israel, to move up to the Golan Heights. This move increased the number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights from an initial number
of some 60 to 170.The Syrian forces arrayed along the Golan Heights consisted of the 7th Infantr Division, the 9th Infantry Division,and the 5th Infantry Division. Each was organized along Soviet lines, with an armored brigade totaling some 130-200 tanks per division. Behind
these first echelon divisions were concentrated the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions,
each with approximately 250 tanks, along with several independent brigades. The total Syrian force facing Israel numbered approximately 1,500 Russian T-54/55 and T-62 tanks supported
by 1,000 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars. The IDF’s plan for defending the Golan Heights was based on two points. First, topography afforded the Israelis well thought-out superior defensive positions. Second,Syrian devotion to the prevailing Soviet operationa level doctrine limited availableopenings for the massive assaults prescribed by that doctrine.An anti-tank barrier was constructed to limit a Syrian armored attack over the 1967cease fire or Purple Line. The purpose of the barrier was to delay the Syrians sufficiently until reserve forces could be committed to reinforce units on the line. Time was the primary issue for both the Israelis and the Syrians. The IDF needed time to deploy reserves before a Syrian breakthrough or, “if politically possible, to mount spoiling attack” as a preemptive measure. The Syrians needed
to quickly penetrate the IDF defenses and reach the edge of the plateau overlooking
the bridges of the River Jordan before the arrival of IDF reserve forces.

This would force the IDF to move their reserves across choke points and up steep narrow winding roads, making a successful counter attack nearly impossible. The Israeli forces defending the Golan Heights were composed of two Israeli armored brigades, the 7th in the northern sector and 188th (Barak) Brigade in the southern sector, consisting of approximately
170 tanks and some 60 artillery pieces. Israeli armored forces were composed of British Centurions and M51 Shermans.The massive Syrian air and artillery strike against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights achieved tactical surprise.The Syrian 7th, 9th, and 5th Infantry
Divisions attacked across the Purple Line, while in the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade repulsed the Syrian 7th Infantry Division. The Syrian 3rd Armored Division, committed
to pass through Israeli’s 7th Infantry Division, also suffered heavily and gained little ground. In the south, the Syrian 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions,taking advantage of the less restrictive
terrain, broke through the defenses of the Barak Brigade. In two days of fighting,the Barak Brigade was virtually destroyed, and the command post at Nafakh surrounded. The Syrian 9th
Infantry Division “had split the Israeli defensive forces, and now threatened the command center at Nafakh. The remnants of the Barak Brigade were barely hanging on and were in desperate need of reinforcements. The collapse of the northern sector could have forced the IDF to fall back to the Jordan River and therefore changed the outcome of the war. The original plan of reinforcing with reserve brigades was falling apart. “As Israeli reserves arrived on the shore of Lake Tiberius and the west bank of the River Jordan,they were immediately sent forward in small groups into battle.At this time, something just short of a miracle was underway at Nafakh. Frantically trying to reach the Golan by any means possible was [Lieutenant] Tzvi ‘Zvika’ Greengold, who had been on a fortnight’s leave.” Lieutenant Greengold had been safely at home, near Haifa, only seven hours earlier. He had just been released from service with the Barak Brigade and was on leave for two weeks prior to attending a company commander’s course. He was one of the first soldiers to make his own way back to the battlefield. At the Nafakh headquarters of the Barak Brigade, the commander, Colonel Ben-Shoham, was analyzing spot reports coming in from his battalion commanders on the size of the Syrian attack. While he was deciding his next moves, he was approached by Lieutenant Greengold, who arrived to find Nafakh in chaos. Greengold, having no troops nor tanks to command, assisted with the removal of the dead and wounded from disabled vehicles. He soon learned that four tanks, three of which had been battle-damaged, were about to arrive. Zvika requested and received command of the four tanks.He was delighted. Lieutenant Greengold was ordered to take the four tanks and move towards the Tapline Route, a major Syrian avenue of approach. Lieutenant Greengold and his four tanks were to be known on the brigade communications network as Force Tzvika.
 Captain Tzvika Greengold in 1973
Tzvika Greengold 2010

By that time, Colonel Ben-Shoham was greatly concerned by the Syrian advances in the southern sector, where the 51st Tank Brigade had broken through and was bypassing the Israeli
fortifications in the vicinity of the Hushniya-Tapline crossroads. Savage nighttime firefights were taking place across the southern Golan Heights, and Israeli troops were cut off in their frontline fortifications. Transmissions to their headquarters at Nafakh finally produced authorization to withdraw, but this was easier said than done, with Syrian forces to their rear. At Kudne, a relieving tank force broke through to Bunker 111, despite strong Syrian forces in the immediate vicinity, and succeeded in evacuating all the men.
Along the southern flank, where the battle was then heaviest, the fight was more difficult. Israeli tanks fought through and relieved Bunker 114 and Bunker 115, but Bunker 116 was completely
surrounded. Unable to get out, the Israelis sat tight in their defenses and called for artillery support. The only available artillery was a single battery of 155mm guns, which was ordered to concentrate on Bunker 116’s position. The fire mission was extremely effective and provided
temporary relief to the troops inside. Because of the penetration in his sector along the Tapline Road, Colonel Ben-Shoham attempted to move the forward headquarters (one tank and onehalftrack) of his brigade from Nafakh to Juhader, where he believed he could
better control the battle. He moved carefully along in the dark, avoiding Syrian formations, and his staff was relieved to reach Juhader. By then, they were under constant heavy shelling,
due to poor IDF communications discipline and successful Syrian SIGINT operations. The Syrians obtained radio fixes every time a communications officer tried to contact his subordinate commanders. In the meantime, TF Zvika, which had left Nafakh several hours before, was moving cautiously along the Tapline Route. Zvika had been intent on joining
Colonel Ben-Shoham, but instead had run into a Syrian tank company. Zvika promptly sent a contact report to Colonel Ben-Shoham and first engaged the enemy at 2100 hours on 6 October. Zvika took advantage of the terrain and limited visibility, moving his force into hull-down positions and letting the enemy come to him. Zvika’s force waited only a short time until one of his tank commanders reported contact with an approaching Syrian column consisting mostly of T-55s. Zvika peered into the gloom and saw them by the dim glow of their “formation lamps and infra-red ‘cats eyes’.At about 2120 hours, Zvika spotted a solitary Syrian tank on the road about four kilometers outside Nafakh and only ten meters from his own Centurion. Zvika tapped his gunner, and the Syrian burst into flames. Fearful of being seen or set ablaze in the horrendous flash of burning fuel and munitions, Zvika ordered his driver to back up fast. He then found that he had no way of communicating with the other tank or of even speaking with his own crew. The shock of the explosion of the Syrian tank had jolted out the radio and intercom circuits. Zvika jumped down to the roadway and stalked over to the other Centurion, ejecting its commander and motioning him to climb aboard the defective tank. “Watch me,” he cautioned the other man, “and do as I do, if possible.Zvika then continued to work his way south along the Tapline Road, the two tanks moving slowly forward, using the terrain to mask their movement. Zvika soon realized that he was alone, the other tank having lost its position in the dark. Moving over the crest of a hill,Zvika was confronted by three Syrian tanks moving towards them with their driving lights on. Three rapid shots from the Centurion’s 105mm gun left the enemy tanks blazing brightly, and the illumination of the area from the fire greatly aided Zvika’s movement. The intruders belonged to the 51st Independent Tank Brigade, and they were feeling their way into the Israeli rear, seeking to exploit the breakthrough. Apparently they had turned on their sidelights to see better, to gain speed.Zvika shifted into a new position and within minutes destroyed three more T55s. Zvika realized that the Tapline Road was a major avenue of approach,that he was frequently outnumbered and he was facing tanks with superior night fighting capabilities. Zvika chose to hold in his current position, take advantage of the defensible terrain, and wait for Syrian forces. Thirty minutes passed until they were alerted by the sound of heavy engines. A long column of T-55s appeared out of the darkness, followed by a procession of trucks. “It was as if the main body of Major Ismail’s 452nd Tank Battalion was on
parade, so perfectly aligned and spaced was the column. Zvika waited until the lead tank was
only twenty meters from where he was hunkered down. The first shot stopped the first target and stalled the entire column Zvika was up against terrible odds, but he had the enemy fixed and was in position to destroy the entire column. Zvika withdrew into the darkness, taking advantage of the scrub and rocky outcrops, only to appear and fire before disappearing again. He kept this uneven match going for over an hour.The Syrians’ sole warning was a crash and a long jet of white flame shooting through the night to destroy another of their vehicles. The Syrians were extremely bewildered by the single shot that kept hitting their tanks from all along the roadway. Frustrated, several Syrian tankers switched on searchlights to try and locate what they thought was a sizeable enemy force. The illumination gave Zvika and his gunner more clear targets to engage. Ten armored vehicles were either destroyed or damaged before Major Ismail ordered the remnants of his battalion to withdraw.
What the Syrians believed was a sizable force was actually the work of a single tank crew.
Several miles further along the Tapline Road at Nafakh, Colonel Ben-Shoham realized he was surrounded. His brigade intelligence officer suggested that as it was impossible to get
back to the Nafakh headquarters by the Tapline Road, they had better cut across country. Colonel Ben-Shoham directed his tank and the headquarters’ half-track to head west toward the ridge of the Golan Heights near Ramat Magshimim. At approximately 0200 on October 7, they reached the Gamla Rise overlooking the Sea of Galilee, a primary objective of the Syrian forces. They were dismayed to observe new Syrian T-62 tanks not far away along
the escarpment, and in full view of Galilee. At that rate, Syrian forces would soon cross into Israel proper. The Israeli tank and its accompanying half-track continued to move along in
dim moonlight, keeping among the boulders on the slopes to screen themselves
from the large Syrian force moving parallel to their position. Colonel Ben-Shoham tried to determine the status of his brigade, and feared that very little remained. Meanwhile back in
Nafakh, a reserve battalion commander named Lieutenant Colonel Uzi More
received permission from the CinC of Northern Command to leave the base and take command of the tanks along the Tapline Route. He was to fight a delaying action along the Tapline
Route to slow the Syrian advance towards Nafakh Camp. This force included Zvika’s small group and two reserve tank platoons of the Northern Command Reserve, which were the
only reserves available in the southern sector. Lieutenant Colonel More received
the order from Colonel Ben- Shoham to mount a counterattack, and proceeded southwards along the Tapline Route, while Tzvika and a platooof tanks drove parallel along the road’s wire fences. Almost immediately, the first tank in Zvika’s column was set ablaze by a rocket-propelled grenade. Zvika saw Syrian tanks equipped with searchlights blocking the road ahead, and Zvikaordered one of the remaining tanks forward to rescue the crew of the burning Centurion. He positioned his own tank to cover in the flank, and both tanks were hit. Zvika’sgunner was injured, while Zvika himself reeled from the shock of the blast and searing pain. Zvika and his crew scrambled from their blazing Centurion, falling to the ground in flames and screaming as flames seared their faces and hands. Zvika’s shirt and trousers were burning,
but he rolled into a ditch and somehow smothered the flames. He was fearful that at any moment his tank, still carrying fuel and ammunition, would blow up. Not realizing the extent of his wounds, he ran towards another tank, shouted garbled instructions, and took command of the vehicle. He then activated the communications system, announcing to all that TF Zvika was still in existence Even as Colonel Ben- Shoham’s relieved acknowledgment faded on the radio, Zvika realized the extent of his wounds, and the terrible burns on his face and hands began to throb and blister. Only Colonel Ben-Shoham’s calm but insistent voice brought him back to reality. Moving straight for him were two Syrian tanks, bearing down with their guns firing. Zvika fired and screamed for his driver to reverse. The tank shuddered as its tracks tore around on the bare rocks, then raced backward into the inferno of the night, its crew still battling against the heavy odds.
The remainder of Colonel Ben-Shoham’s counterattack force also made contact with the mechanized infantry that had been accompanying the tanks that Zvika encountered. More’s tanks were hit and disabled, one at a time. When More saw a Syrian soldier aim an antitank rocket at his command tank,he grabbed hold of his free machine gun and opened fire. However, his machine gun jammed and the Syrian grenadier let fly. More was thrown from his tank and lost an arm and an eye in the blast.  Colonel Ben-Shoham reported up the chain of command the failure of his counterattack and did his best to stabilize the situation. With minimal resources he calmed the nerves of his commanders, called for artillery support, and attempted to maintain situational awareness of the battle that surrounded.

In order to improve command and control, Colonel Ben-Shoham requested the command of all forces in the southern Golan from the regional commander. It was apparent that the
Syrians were swarming all over the southern sector of the Golan Heights. In the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade was defending positions in and around Booster Ridge against the Syrian
7th Infantry Division, elements of the 3rd Armored Division, and a brigade of Moroccan troops. Fighting from prepared positions, the Centurionequipped 7th Armored Brigade held out
against odds sometimes as high as 15 to 1. Under constant artillery and air attack,
Colonel Ben Gal, the 7th Armored Brigade commander, calmly directed his dwindling forces, maintaining a reserve which he moved from ambush to blocking position to battle position
during 72 hours of continuous fighting. The 7th Armored Brigade, although down to a handful of operational tanks,never gave up their primary positions.In the southern sector, the crisis continued to develop. Sunrise on the 7th of October revealed that the Syrians had
achieved a major breakthrough in the southern sector of the Golan Heights. The 132nd Mechanized Brigade and 47th Independent Tank Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division had made a major penetration along the Rafid El-Al road.The Syrians exploited this penetration
with the 43rd, 51st, and 91st Armored Brigade, a force of more than 500 tanks. Colonel Ben-Shoham identified the advancing second-echelon Syrian columns, and chose to regroup his forces and attempt to delay the Syrian penetration. His tank and half-track sped back
towards Nafakh, dodging tank and RPG fire along the entire route. Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route. He decided his best course of action would be to rally his meager forces and join his deputy, Colonel Yisraeli, and the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade (now reaching the front
in small numbers). “Every three tanks now reaching the front were assembled into make-shift
platoons, patched into the communications network and rushed towards Ben- Shoham’s position. All in all, two companies were pieced together, and the newly formed units reached Nafakh and re-established the Barak Brigade’s headquarters. At approximately 1145, Major Baruch Lenschner identified a lead element from the Syrian 1st Armored Division
as the 91st Armored Brigade. Major Lenschner, Deputy Commander of an independent Northern Command battalion, was commanding a hastily assembled force of initially 14 Centurions. That was now down to two operable tanks. He reported sighting the T-62s of
the 91st Armored Brigade and stated that his position was untenable. Colonel Ben-Shoham urged the young major to hold at any cost. Major Lenschner and his small force were not heard from again. It was later determined that Major Lenschner perished when the warhead
of a Sagger missile punched through the Centurion’s turret armorand his force was overrun.15 Outflanked, the brigade headquarters at Nafakh was now under attack. Ben- Shoham was ordered to return to Nafakh for the base’s defense, and ordered his deputy Lieutenant-Colonel
Yisraeli to set out and cover his force. Unknown to Colonel Ben-Shoham, Zvika had met up with Colonel Yisraeli’s force at dawn and fought in the battle that delayed the Syrian 51st Tank rigade’s attack along the Tapline Route. Just when Zvika had thought they were gaining the upper hand, Yisraeli frantically ordered his force back to Nafakh to escape the Syrians’ outflanking movement. Throughout the retreat, Colonel Ben- Shoham’s tank came under heavy Syrian artillery and tank fire. Both he and Yisraeli succeeded in destroying more
than twenty Syrian tanks and vehicles. As the battle raged and Syrian tanks approached to close range, Yisraeli’s gunner announced that the tank was out of ammunition. Yisraeli ordered his
driver to charge an oncoming T-62 with machine guns blazing. Within moments,
his tank in flames, Lieutenant-Colonel Yisraeli was dead. Ben-Shoham, unaware of the fate of his deputy, continued to issue orders. Standing upright in the turret, Ben-Shoham observed
the battle, firing at Syrian crewmen fleeing their burning vehicles. As he searched the hills for Syrian commandos, a sudden 7.62mm volley killedColonel Ben-Shoham. Losing radio con-
“Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route.”tact with his commanders, Zvika left the roadway and approached Nafakh cross-country from the southeast without encountering Syrian forces, but just missing a Syrian ambush. The 91st Armored Brigade continued its push towards Nafakh. Lieutenant- Colonel Menachem (Pinie) Cooperman, deputy commander of the District (administrative) Brigade, organized Nafakh’s defenses and issued antitank weapons to soldiers manning the perimeter. Standing at the southern perimeter fence, he watched the advance of approximately two Syrian tank companies, and ordered the advanced headquarters group to withdraw from Nafakh. As this force left the base, hundreds of Syrian shells rained down on the camp. Syrian tanks were now entering Nafakh unhindered, firing pointblank at the base’s evacuated buildings, raking the Israeli defenders with coaxial and turret-mounted machine guns. Lieutenant- Colonel Cooperman grabbed the division’s deputy intelligence and operations officers, a bazooka and six shells,and rushed to try and stop the Syrians from taking Nafakh. Suddenly, the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade arrived to save the day. Firing at long range, the 679th managed to hold the Syrians and push them out of Nafakh. Yet Syrian tanks were still
inside the base, and Lieutenant Colonel Cooperman’s determined antitank unit, now out of ammunition, was cornered by a T-62. As the T-62’s 115mm gun turned towards them, the tank went up n a ball of flame. Approaching the rescued officers was a battered tank moving at a slow speed. It was Zvika! Zvika had arrived at Nafakh camp just as the Syrians were breaking in, he had joined forces with a reserve tank, and with more enthusiasm than good sense his exhausted crew attacked the Syrians.
“Zvika fired wildly at everything in sight — at the hills and the fences and at the Syrian tanks that had already flattened the perimeter fence. The truth was that his tank driver was in the
shock of exhaustion and could no longer react to orders after twenty hours of continuous, nerve-twisting battle. During the pandemonium, Zvika attached himself to the 679th Armored
Brigade and with them forced the Syrians out of the ruined camp and back
onto the Tapline Road. The Syrian advance had been stopped at Nafakh and the blackened, smoking wreckage of their tanks, personnel carriers, and trucks lay everywhere, in the
camp and on the dun-colored hills. “When the battle around Zvika ceased,he found himself standing in the turret of his fifth or sixth Centurion, suddenly unable to make a decision as to what to do next. The Barak Brigade intelligence officer — now the nominal brigade
commander — rushed up to greet the lieutenant. As he fought an overwhelming
lethargy, Zvika painfully climbed from the turret and carefully dropped to the ground, where he leveled his eyes on the intelligence officer and apologetically murmured, ‘I can’t anymore.’ The intelligence officer said not a word; he hugged Zvika close and led him to the medical evacuation center. There is no way to calculate the damage that that iron-willed redheaded youth inflicted upon the best plan with which Syria has ever entered a conflict.

To say that the actions of Lieutenant Zvika Greengold directly affected the
outcome of the Yom Kippur war would be an overstatement. But it goes without
saying that his actions greatly aided the successful defense of the Golan
Heights. “For his incredible 24 hours on the Golan, Lieutenant Greengold was
awarded the Ot Hagvura (Order of Bravery), the IDF’s medal for supreme
valor.


MAJ Michael D. Wickman, commissioned
in Armor from OCS, has
served as a mortar platoon leader
in 2-37 Armor and a tank platoon
leader in 1-37 Armor in Germany.
He served as a tactical intelligence
officer in G2 TAC, 34th Infantry Division,
and assistant J2, Task Force
Timberwolf, Guatemala. He served
as S2, S4, and tank company commander
in 1-94 Armor. He is a
graduate of AOBC, AOAC, MIOTC,
and CAS3.


                                          Rare home 8 mm film made by a IDF reserve soldier
                                          in south of the Golan during the Yom Kuppur War
                                          including a Syrian Mig 17 crash near the force
                                          during battle






IDF command half track hit during the battle

Iraqi tanks hit by the IDF in shouth of the Golan



188 Brigade remember Gilade Shalit



Gilad Shalit , born 28 August 1986) is an Israeli soldier who was captured on 25 June 2006 by Hamas in a cross-border raid. He was abducted near the Kerem Shalom crossing (in Israel), and has been held as a prisoner in the Gaza Strip by Hamas since then.

Shalit, has a rank of corporal in the IDF's Armor Corps at the time of his capture, has since been promoted to staff sergeant.

He was the first Israeli soldier captured by Palestinian militants since Nachshon Wachsman in 1994. Shalit holds French citizenship, a fact that encouraged France and the European Union to be involved to some extent in efforts to release him.He also received Italian and American citizenship after his abduction.

Hamas has refused requests from the International Committee of the Red Cross to allow the ICRC to visit Shalit on the grounds that any such visit could betray the location where Shalit is being held. Several human rights organizations have stated that the terms and conditions of Shalit's detention are contrary to international humanitarian law. In exchange for his release, Hamas is demanding the release of all female and underage Palestinian prisoners held in Israel, as well as a further 1,000 prisoners, a number of which are convicted by Israeli courts on terrorism charges. There are currently around 8,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel. The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, which released a report in September 2009, called for Shalit to be released.

My son is serving in Gilad's company today

more in:http://www.habanim.org/en/gilad_en.html



IDF 188 Tank Brigade "Barak" - battle Legacy 1973 Yom Kippur War

חטיבה 188 במלחמת יום הכיפורים 1973





During the Yom Kippur War


With Syrian tanks overrunning the Golan Heights' southern sector, only selfless acts of bravery by the 188th Barak Brigade prevented the Syrians from capturing the heights and threatening the entire north of Israel.

Defeat seemed to be imminent for the state of Israel. The Syrians' Soviet-style massive frontal assault was too much to bear, and the Israeli front lines had already collapsed. The Israeli general in charge of the entire front had abandoned his nearly surrounded headquarters (HQ) and retired to a makeshift command post a few kilometers back. With two Syrian brigades advancing on the headquarters and no Israeli reserves in sight, defending the headquarters--left in the hands of infantrymen supported by only two trackless tanks mustered from the camp's repair depot--seemed almost futile.

On October 6, 1973, during Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, a Syrian armored force of 1,400 tanks backed by more than 1,000 artillery pieces and supporting air power began a coordinated assault along the 36-mile-long Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights in the north of Israel. That attack coincided with a similar onslaught by Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal, suddenly forcing Israel to fight a two-front war.

Israeli defense doctrine relies on the standing army to hold the line with air support while the reserves are mobilized. Therefore, the two Israeli brigades that stood in the Syrians' way in the Golan had the daunting task of holding off the onslaught long enough for Israel's reserve mobilization to kick in. The 7th Armored Brigade's epic defense of the northern Golan has come to be widely regarded as one of the finest defensive stands in military history. Less publicity has been given to the heroism of the shattered fragments of the 188th (Barak) Brigade in slowing the Syrian advance in the south. In some respects, however, the Barak Brigade's story is more incredible, considering the fact that hundreds of Syrian tanks had overrun its sector and were held off by only a handful of tanks.

The 1973 conflict was as much about honor as it was about real estate. In the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel had seized the Golan Heights, which Syria had turned into one large network of bunkers and artillery positions. For years, Syrian gunners, shooting at random and without provocation, would fire on Israeli fishermen plying their trade on the Sea of Galilee or at Israeli farmers in the Hula Valley below. In a costly uphill battle, the Israelis swept out the Syrian defenders and put an end to the harassment. The loss of the Golan Heights in 1967, however, had been humiliating to Syria.

Between 1967 and 1973, there were frequent skirmishes along the cease-fire line. For months leading up to its attack, the Syrian army had been fully mobilized and on war alert. Since the Israelis were accustomed to seeing those forces at battle strength, the Syrians were able to make final attack preparations without sending noteworthy warning signals. Furthermore, with tensions escalating between the two countries, Israeli leadership feared that strengthening its defenses might be misconstrued as preparation for a pre-emptive strike, thus provoking the Syrians to attack.

The Golan Heights are made up of a 480-square-mile volcanic (basalt) rock plateau perched above the Hula Valley to the west and Jordan Valley to the south. It rises gently from 600 feet in the south to 3,000 feet in the north, with abrupt escarpments dominating the valleys to the west and south. It is transected in some areas by impassable canyons, limiting the number of routes leading up from the valleys to the heights. Since the heights' geography restricted defensive mobility, Israel continued its advance against the routed Syrians in 1967 until a defensible line was reached--a string of extinct volcano cones that commands strategic views of Damascus on one side and of all northern Israel on the other.

Israeli defenses were based on 17 fortified observation posts. The Purple Line, as the 1967 cease-fire line was known, marked the end of the no man's land separating Syria from the Golan. Lacking a true defensive barrier, the Israelis had dug a 20-mile-long anti-tank ditch along the border from Mount Hermon to Rafid, an obstacle Syrian armor would be forced to cross under fire from Israeli tanks positioned behind ramparts. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1973, the Golan Heights were defended by two armored brigades: the 7th, which had only been dispatched to the northern sector on October 4, and the 188th (Barak) Brigade, a regular fixture intimately familiar with the area's terrain, in the south. The modified Centurion and M-48 Patton tanks fielded by both brigades were fitted with the 105mm NATO gun and modern diesel engines.

Considering the faulty Israeli intelligence assessment that, at most, armed skirmishes with the Syrians would break out, the 170 tanks and 70 artillery pieces in the Golan were thought to be enough to meet any Syrian threats, at least until the reserves would arrive.

Against that comparatively small force, the Syrian army fielded five divisions for its attack: two armored and three mechanized infantry, including some 1,400 tanks. Approximately 400 of those tanks were T-62s, the most modern Soviet-bloc tank at the time, equipped with a 115mm smoothbore gun and infrared night-fighting capability. The balance were T-54s and T-55s armed with 100mm guns. The Syrian plan called for its 5th, 7th and 9th mechanized infantry divisions, in BTR-50 armored personnel carriers (APCs) supported by 900 tanks, to breach the Israeli lines, opening the way for the 1st and 3rd armored divisions to move in with their 500 tanks to capture the entire Golan Heights before Israel had a chance to mobilize.

At 2 p.m. on October 6, Syrian gunners opened up a tremendous barrage along the entire front as a prelude to their two-pronged attack--a northern one in the vicinity of the Kuneitra-Damascus road and one in the south where Rafid bulges into Syria.

Facing Colonel Avigdor Ben-Gal's 7th Armored Brigade in the Golan's northern sector were the Syrian 3rd Armored Division under Brig. Gen. Mustapha Sharba, the 7th Mechanized Infantry Division and the Assad Republican Guard. When the Syrian assault began, mine-clearing tanks and bridge-layers led the way to overcome the Israeli obstacles. Naturally, those engineering vehicles were the 7th's first targets, but Syrian infantrymen, braving intense fire from the heights, rushed forward and used their entrenching tools to build up enough earthen causeways for their tanks to negotiate the Israeli anti-tank ditches.

While the Israelis took out every Syrian vehicle they could get into their sights, the sheer mass of some 500 enemy tanks and 700 APCs advancing toward their lines ensured that the defenses would be overwhelmed. The number of defenders dwindled as Israeli tanks were knocked out, yet the vastly outnumbered Israelis managed to take a heavy toll on Syrian armor. In spite of their heavy losses, the Syrians pressed their attack without letup, yet the overexerted 7th managed to hold its ground, throwing stopgap blocking actions wherever the Syrians were on the verge of breaking through.

When darkness fell, the Israelis had nothing to match the Syrians' night-vision gear and had to allow the enemy armor to advance to ranges effective for night fighting. In the close fighting, the Syrians succeeded in seizing some of the high ground, but a counterattack by the small group of persistent defenders forced them back. When some Syrian tanks did overrun the Israeli lines, the 7th's gunners would rotate their turrets to destroy them and then immediately turn their attention back to other oncoming tanks. It amounted to an armored version of hand-to-hand combat.

The battle raged for two more days as the Syrians, seemingly oblivious to their heavy losses, continued their assault without letup. By the afternoon of October 9, the 7th Brigade was down to six tanks protecting what was for all intents and purposes a clear path into Israel's north.

Those last few tanks fought until they were down to their last rounds. Then, just as the 7th Brigade tanks were finally starting to pull back, they were suddenly augmented by an impromptu force of some 15 tanks. The Syrians believed the clock had run out and that the first of the fresh Israeli reservists had arrived, and the Syrian offensive ran out of steam. In truth, it was a motley force of repaired tanks crewed by injured and other crewman, which had been mustered by Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Hanan, a veteran commander who, upon hearing about the outbreak of war, had hurried home from his honeymoon overseas. By virtue of its timing, that force proved to be the 7th Brigade's saving grace. As individual tanks began to augment the Israeli forces, the Syrians, exhausted from three days of continuous fighting and unaware of how close to victory they actually were, turned in retreat. Hundreds of destroyed tanks and APCs littering the valley below the Israeli ramparts were testimony to the horrible destruction that had taken place there, leading an Israeli colonel to dub it the "Valley of Tears."

Meanwhile, the Syrians, whose objectives included seizing the bridges spanning the Jordan River (most of which could be easily reached through the southern Golan), concentrated a large part of their attack in that sector. Up against hundreds of enemy tanks in a line of armor as far as the eye could see, the Barak Brigade crews had no choice but to hold fast, because the terrain did not allow for much defensive maneuvering. Retreat would give the Syrians nearly free reign to seize the entire heights and move on the Israeli settlements in the valley below.

The Syrian advance was initially slowed by an Israeli minefield and by deadly, accurate cannon fire. With dozens of Syrian tanks destroyed, the first few hours of the war were encouraging for the Israeli crewmen--their intense training was paying off. Knowing they would be outnumbered in any engagement, the Israeli tankers had trained relentlessly on gunnery skills and rapid target acquisition to ensure kills on the first shot. Undeterred by their losses, however, the Syrians kept coming, apparently convinced that, if worst came to worst, the mass of their onslaught would ultimately overwhelm the defenders.

When fighter aircraft were called in to help stem the flow of Syrian armor, many of the Douglas A-4 Skyhawks and McDonnell F-4E Phantoms that responded to the plea were shot down or damaged by the Syrians' dense anti-aircraft umbrella. Aware that Israeli doctrine relied on air power to even the score against the Syrian numerical advantage, the Syrians had acquired massive quantities of the latest Soviet missile and anti-aircraft systems. With the help of Soviet advisers, they created an air defense network over the Golan that was thicker than the one protecting Hanoi during the Vietnam War.

With their air support thus limited, the tankers were on their own--and the fate of northern Israel was in their hands. The Israeli tanks stood their ground and were knocked out one by one. Pushed beyond their limits, the defenses in the southern sector broke.

Bypassing the Israeli fortifications and pouring through gaps in the defenses, Syrian tanks pushed through the Israeli lines onto a wide-open plain that was ideal for tanks. The Iraelis knew that they had to hold on at all costs to allow time for the reserves to mobilize, and in many cases the tank crews sacrificed themselves rather than give ground. As the hours passed, fewer and fewer Israeli tanks were left to stem the tide of oncoming tanks. The Syrian force split into a two-pronged advance. Colonel Tewfik Jehani's 1st Armored Division moved northward toward the Golan command headquarters of Maj. Gen. Rafael Eitan, situated on the road leading down to the Bnot Yaakov Bridge, over the Jordan River and into the Israeli hinterland. The second prong of the Syrian attack, spearheaded by the 46th Armored Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division, moved south from Rafid on the southern access road toward El Al, with units breaking off toward the north in the direction of the Arik Bridge at the northern tip of the Sea of Galilee. Some 600 tanks were now engaged in the southern Golan, against which stood 12 tanks and isolated units that had been cut off near the various fortifications along the line.

Night offered no respite from the Syrian advance as they capitalized on their advantage of sophisticated night-vision equipment. The Israeli crews' long-distance firing efficiency was hampered by their lack of adequate night-fighting equipment. They did their best to overcome this obstacle by ordering illumination rounds to light up the sky, in conjunction with the xenon light projectors mounted on their tanks. Those were no match for the Syrians' infrared searchlights, so the Israelis did what they do best--improvise. They directed small tank units to carry out stopgap blocking actions against the far superior enemy forces--a tactic that may have prevented the Syrians from overrunning the entire Golan.

One of those lethal holding actions that have become legend was led by a young lieutenant named Zvi Gringold, affectionately known as "Lieutenant Zvicka," whose hit-and-run tactics are credited with single-handedly holding at bay a major thrust by almost 50 tanks. His guerrilla-style tactics on the route leading toward his brigade's HQ caused the Syrians to believe they were up against a sizable Israeli force. After more than 10 of its tanks were destroyed, the Syrian column withdrew, its commander deciding to hold off and deal with the Israeli force in daylight. Gringold continued to engage the Syrians throughout the night and following day, destroying upward of 30 tanks, until injuries, burns and exhaustion caught up with him and he was evacuated. Gringold recovered and was subsequently awarded Israel's highest decoration, Ot Hagvura, for his heroic defense of Nafakh.

Another blocking force operating in the south, albeit attached to the 7th Brigade, was "Force Tiger" under Captain Meir Zamir. Force Tiger's seven tanks were sent to block a column of some 40 Syrian tanks that had broken through at Rafid and was heading north--a move that threatened to cut off and isolate the 7th Brigade. Force Tiger laid an ambush that succeeded in destroying half the Syrian tanks during the wee hours of the morning. When 20 tanks escaped, Zamir prepared a second ambush that succeeded in finishing off the Syrian battalion just after dawn the next morning.

Yet another Syrian thrust by two brigades was advancing rapidly on the southern access road in that wide-open sector and inexplicably stopped short in its tracks just before reaching El Al. While some of its units fanned off toward other objectives to the north, a large part of the Syrian force failed to press its advantage, a move that in effect meant that the Syrians just waited for the Israeli reserves to arrive and engage them. A number of theories abound as to why the Syrians would halt their advance in the midst of their momentum, including fear of an ambush on what certainly should have been a heavily defended route, lack of flexibility and initiative once their objectives had been achieved, overextended supply lines and the more far-fetched fear of an Israeli nuclear reprisal in that critical hour. Whatever the true reason, their lack of initiative at a critical moment robbed the Syrians of the chance to reach the Jordan River--and perhaps beyond--virtually unopposed.

In the morning, the Syrians pressed their attack yet again. The few remaining defenders of the Barak Brigade pleaded for air support, which again suffered heavy losses. Ironically, the Syrians helped solve the problem of foiling the anti-aircraft missile threat. After the Syrians fired rockets at Israeli civilian areas, the Chel Ha'Avir (Israel Defense Forces/Air Force, or IDF/AF) responded with reprisal attacks on Syrian infrastructure in Damascus and beyond. To defend against these attacks, the Syrians pulled back some of their missile batteries from the Golan front. Overall, it took the IDF/AF several days to develop tactics and gain experience in defeating Syrian air defense systems, and 27 Israeli aircraft were lost on the Golan front in ground-support missions, as well as scores of others suffering various degrees of damage.

On the morning of October 7, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan toured the Golan front and recognized how critical the situation truly was. Not only were the access routes into the Golan threatened, but also the entire north of Israel. Grasping the very real prospect of a Syrian breakthrough into integral Israel, the minister of defense considered a retreat to a line just forward of the escarpment overlooking the Jordan Valley for a major defensive stand--in effect putting his forces' backs against a wall. Israel prepared to destroy the bridges over the Jordan River to prevent a Syrian breakthrough.

The Syrian 1st Armored Division was advancing up the route toward the Golan HQ at Nafakh. Colonel Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, the Barak Brigade's commander, realized his brigade was for all intents and purposes destroyed. He therefore organized and led a small group of surviving tanks in a holding action that slowed the Syrian advance on his HQ for several hours until he and the rest of the defenders were killed. With the brigade commander dead, no reserves in sight and two Syrian brigades advancing toward the Golan HQ--and with some units having bypassed the base on both flanks--the situation could only be described as grave. Lead elements of the Syrian brigades actually reached Nafakh and broke through the base's southern perimeter. One Syrian T-55 crashed into General Eitan's HQ, only to be knocked out by the last operational tank in Gringold's platoon.

At that point, Eitan evacuated his headquarters to an improvised location farther to the north. Those left to defend the base manned two trackless Centurions from the camp repair depot and fired bazookas in a final stand that knocked out several Syrian tanks until those last Israeli tanks were destroyed.

The 188th Barak Brigade was no more. The Syrians were poised to overrun the Golan headquarters at Nafakh and, seemingly, the entire Golan. That final stand, however, was enough to buy a few crucial additional minutes. While the Syrians paused to regroup after their final opposition had been neutralized, the first Israeli reserve units began reaching what had become the front lines. Finding Syrian tanks milling about their command headquarters, the Israelis immediately opened fire and attacked, dispersing the Syrians.

The arrival of the Israeli reservists spelled the beginning of the end for Syria. For both sides, the war had been about time--the Israelis doing all they could to buy time until their reserves arrived, and the Syrians racing against the clock to achieve their objectives before the Israeli mobilization. While many more bloody battles would take place, those first reserve units coming up the Golan and engaging the Syrians at Nafakh meant that the tide had turned.

The reservists found the Syrians enjoying nearly free reign in the Golan's southern sector. With Syrian tanks advancing along the routes down toward the Jordan River, the critical situation allowed no time to organize divisions and brigades. Instead, platoons and companies of tanks and other units were rushed off to battle as quickly as the forces could be mustered, at times being thrown in against Syrian battalions and even brigades. The fresh Israeli reserve units halted the near--and, in some cases, actual--retreat of what remained of their front-line forces and set about checking the Syrian advance. By midnight on day two of the war, the reserves had managed to stabilize what had been a disintegrating front--with the Syrians having penetrated to areas a mere 10-minute drive from the Jordan River and Sea of Galilee and to less than a kilometer from El Al on the southern access road.

Those gains had not come easily. In spite of their superior numbers, the Syrians' supply lines, extending great distances from their rear areas to points deep into the Golan, had been decimated by the Israeli defenders, and they could no longer replenish and support their forces. Convoys of supplies and reinforcements were under constant attack by the IDF/AF, as well as IDF armor and other ground forces, severely straining the Syrian advance. While the Syrians dug in to consolidate their gains, the Israelis went on the offensive.

Brigadier General Moshe Peled led a division up the Ein Gev road into the center of the southern sector while Maj. Gen. Dan Laner's division moved up the Yehudia road farther to the north--a parallel advance that boxed in the 1st Syrian Armored Division and effectively brought the Syrians' brief conquest to an end. The Syrians fought viciously to free themselves from that pincer movement. A major confrontation near Hushniya camp, which the Syrians had captured the previous night and turned into a forward supply base, ended with hundreds of wrecked, burning and smoldering Syrian tanks and armored vehicles and other vehicles littering the landscape.

By October 10, the Israelis had forced the Syrians back to the antebellum cease-fire line in the southern sector. Well aware of the strong Syrian defensive preparations in the south, Israel chose the northern Golan, with its more difficult, less-defended terrain, as the launching area for its counterattack into Syria itself. Among the units joining the counterattack was the reincarnated Barak Brigade. Since 90 percent of its original commanders had been killed or wounded, Barak's remnants were joined by replacements, reorganized and returned to fighting strength for the counteroffensive that penetrated deep into Syria--until a United Nations-sanctioned cease-fire came into effect on October 23, officially ending hostilities.

source:http://www.eze33.com/brigade/barak.htm


A memorial for colonel Ben Shoham the commander of the brigade in the war on the Golan

IDF Sherman platoon pre 1967

IDF Sherman platoon pre 1967

1967 arab propaganda

1967 arab propaganda
Israel must be strong